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Virginie  Grzelczyk
Abstract:  Over the past two decades, the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea has allegedly developed nuclear energy while suﬀering 
near collapse caused by catastrophic economic policies. This article 
presents an evaluation of North Korea’s contemporary energy policies 
and suggests that despite retaining communist ideals and “Chu’che” 
policies, North Korea has slowly started to modernise its energy sector 
and recognises the necessity to start engaging with the international 
community. While it is argued that Pyongyang’s newfound concerns for 
sustainable development, equity and the environment are a welcomed 
departure from its usual belligerent rhetoric and present a number of 
exciting engagement opportunities, the regime has not abandoned its 
nuclear energy programme.
Keywords:  North Korea, energy security, economic policy, en-
ergy security dilemma
Introduction
Nestled east of China and south of Russia, the Korean peninsula has 
played a prominent role in history due to its geographical location. 
Largely ignored by western powers for many centuries, it weath-
ered many conquests by neighbouring Japan before becoming an 
important strategic stopover on major trade routes linking Europe 
and the Americas in the late 19th century. Eventually, Korea became 
a casualty of World War II and divided into two halves to facilitate 
the removal of Japanese colonial structures. If Korea was of geos-
trategic use, it was never particularly sought after for its natural 
resources as almost half of its landmass is covered by forests and 
woodlands, while numerous mountains leave only about a ﬁfth of 
the territory as arable land. Natural resources include coal, which 
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both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic 
of Korea have abundantly mined. Both North and South Korea have 
chosen very diﬀerent development paths, with North Korea at-
tempting to sustain a failing communist system while South Korea 
embraced capitalism. It is now generally accepted that Seoul suc-
ceeded in becoming a world economic player, and that Pyongyang 
has turned most of its attention toward developing nuclear weap-
ons in a bid to ensure its own security in the region, given the US’s 
large military forces still stationed in the South and Japan. 
A general understanding of North Korea’s position regarding en-
ergy and economics, especially coming from the Seoul-Pyongyang 
competition patterns that were seen during the 1960s and 1970s 
maybe harvested from Cumings and Oberdorfer as they provide 
a good picture of North Korea’s energy sector during the Cold War 
and into the 1990s.1 More recently though, the Nautilus Institute 
has gathered extensive data on North Korean minerals, power grids 
and energy shortages, and has been able to paint part of North Ko-
rea’s energy picture by meeting, on numerous occasions, with North 
Korean o^cials.2 A lot of attention has been given to North Korea’s 
peaceful and military nuclear energy programmes,3 but ultimately, 
North Korea’s approach toward its own energy situation, and what 
its potential goals are within the system has largely been ignored.
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This article focuses on how the North Korean regime conceives 
of energy and energy security by de-linking energy and frequently 
cited international concerns over North Korea’s development and 
possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As such, the 
work argues that though North Korea appears to be a rather mono-
lithic state that resists changes and does not adapt well to new ideas 
and technologies, Pyongyang has started to develop a  rather nu-
anced energy discourse. The work therefore focuses on: 1. summa-
rising North Korea’s traditional energy concerns that focus on pro-
duction and avoiding economic decline, 2. introducing the notion 
that North Korea has begun to shift eﬀorts toward more e^cient 
and green technologies, and 3. suggesting that North Korea might 
be seeking a new place within the international energy community 
by taking a more active role in sustainable development.
The data presented in this article has been extracted from ap-
proximately 1,200 energy-related news items published by the Ko-
rean Central News Agency (KCNA) between 1997 until 2011. The 
KCNA is the only o^cial press organ in North Korea and has pub-
licised news on behalf of the North Korean elite since 1946 while 
providing an accessible archive after 1997. Although the KCNA is 
known for its anti-American rhetoric and general Kim-family-fo-
cused propaganda, it has also always provided very technical infor-
mation on North Korea and the rest of the world. Hence, despite 
the shortcomings that should be anticipated from the absence of 
alternative information channels to corroborate facts, the data pre-
sented here gives an unprecedented record of North Korea’s evolv-
ing stance on economic change and modernisation, its rhetoric and 
understanding of past, present and future energy deals with others 
and its overall understanding of energy security and evolving ap-
proaches toward developing a stable and sustainable domestic en-
ergy sector. 
North Korea´s Traditional Energy Focus 
The Korean War (1951) left the Koreas artiﬁcially separated by an 
Armistice since 1953. Nothing, however, is artiﬁcial about the dif-
ferences that have sprouted from the separation, both politically 
and economically. South Korea was economically and militarily 
bolstered by the US for decades, enabling Seoul to develop light 
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industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s before it became an “Asian 
Tiger” and transformed into one of the most advanced technology-
producing countries in the world. South Korea’s political system 
also mutated from near-totalitarianism in the 1960s and 1970s into 
a ﬂourishing democracy: the country is now a recognised interna-
tional player, sponsoring events such as the FIFA World Cup, and 
hosting the 2010 G20 Summit. In the North the story could not be 
more diﬀerent: under Soviet and Communist Chinese inﬂuences, 
General Kim Il Sung, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s 
spiritual and political father, cultivated isolation and autarky, pro-
moting economic plans and over-industrialisation. Pyongyang 
maintained scant contacts with the rest of the world, with the ex-
ception of Beijing and Moscow: an alliance with Mao’s China ena-
bled North Korea to receive preferential treatment and economic 
assistance while closeness with the USSR meant that hard currency 
was not always needed when trading with the Soviet giant. By the 
early 1990s it was clear that North Korea had failed to develop and 
modernise enough to compete with South Korea, and with most of 
the developing and developed nations in the world. Kim suggests 
that highly unrealistic economic plans based on fallacious growth 
projections in the 1980s led to such a debacle, but those were, un-
fortunately, only a prelude to what was to come:  the end of the 
USSR had devastating eﬀects for North Korea, as it suddenly lost 
a  large part of its crude oil supply along with a market to sell its 
manufactured products.4 
Producing At Any Cost
While industrialisation often relied on around-the clock exploita-
tion of both people and resources, climactic conditions swept away 
many of the North’s hopes for a  robust economy: droughts and 
ﬂoods led to tragic famines in the 1990s with millions of lives lost 
with state teetering on the verge of economic collapse.5 Subsequent 
nuclear ventures aimed at keeping the US at bay while potential-
ly providing a reliable source of much-needed energy entrenched 
North Korea even more as Pyongyang was heavily sanctions by the 
international community and could rely only on a  few states for 
limited economic exchanges. Old “allies” such as Russia and China 
started to request that North Korea pay for materials and goods in 
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cash. Even international aid was extremely regulated and limited, 
and only a  few organisations currently operate on North Korean 
soil.6 
Given those extreme conditions, it is hardly surprising that 
North Korea has focused its eﬀorts on two major tasks: producing 
as much energy as possible and trying to alleviate the devastating 
eﬀects that its crumbling economy had on its infrastructure by at-
tempting to secure aid and investments. While many thought that 
North Korea was on the brink of collapse upon the death of Kim Il 
Sung in 1994, his son Kim Jong Il managed to consolidate power 
and attempted to achieve some of the policy goals formulated by 
his father.7 Energy directives created by Kim Il Sung emphasised hy-
dro-electric power and were still being implemented in 2009 when 
Pyongyang announced that ‘President Kim Il Sung’s desires’ had 
come true through the construction of the Kangwon, Anbyon and 
Wonsan power stations.8 In the late 1990s, North Korea’s energy 
discourse was still centred on increasing outputs, but with a budget 
that would both support the construction of new power stations to 
alleviate power shortages as well as investments in new technolo-
gies such as coal gasiﬁcation.9 Emphasis was also put on publicising 
the construction of a number of new hydro-electric plans and Kim 
Jong Il’s ﬁeld visits were used to showcase North Korea’s drive to de-
velop new technologies: a visit to the Huichon Machine Tool Fac-
tory highlighted new hydroelectric generators,10 while a visit to the 
Korean People’s Army Unit 614 in early 2004 showed that a part-
nership with Kim Chaek University of Technology had developed 
wind-power.11 On many of his ﬁeld guidance outings, Kim Jong Il’s 
message was clearly voiced: priority was given to increasing North 
Korea’s power output, calling for developing energy innovation 
technologies.12 The DPRK’s ﬂag is reﬂective of this economic ambi-
tion, as it represents Mt. Paektu, one of North Korea’s most impor-
tant mountains and supposed birthplace of Kim Il Sung along with 
the representation of a hydro-electric power station.13 This drive for 
energy can be seen in other parts of North Korean life as well: the 
2005 Worker’s Party Committee’s slogan chanted that its comrades 
should ‘produce more nonferrous minerals and non-minerals at ore 
mines!’14 while new books and CDs produced in the past few years 
celebrate a story called ‘Spring in My Native Town’ which lauds the 
eﬀorts of those who built hydro-electric power stations.15
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A System Reaching its Limits
In a  candid manner, North Korea largely publicised its energy 
shortages and had to ‘solve the electricity problem of the coun-
try and revitalise the independent national economy.’16 Parallel 
reporting from Korean specialist Oh, in late 1999, highlighted this 
shortage by describing North Korea as a land where ‘workers are 
idle, factory chimneys are cold, power outages are frequent, mo-
torised transportation is slow and intermittent’.17 More surprising-
ly is the lack of a nuclear energy propaganda policy though North 
Korea’s tendency to blame Washington for not holding its end of 
the Agreed Framework bargain,18 namely building two light-wa-
ter reactors and providing Pyongyang with heavy oil shipments 
to compensate for energy losses due to North Korea’s freezing of 
its civilian nuclear programme led to more vociferous outbursts 
against the US throughout 2003 when the Agreed Framework was 
o^cially buried and Pyongyang withdrew from the Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty.19 During this time, North Korea often insisted on 
how Washington had failed to fulﬁl its obligations, and resumed 
the DPRK nuclear programme.20 There is evidence which suggests 
that Washington did aim to ensure that ‘the failure of enhanced 
diplomacy should be demonstrably attributable to Pyongyang’21 
though Pyongyang’s uranium enriched production was a key ele-
ment in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation 
programme collapse.22 North Korea also actively sought compen-
sation for losses of electricity from KEDO which had been created 
to manage the 1994 Agreed Framework, but was denied on several 
occasions.23
Seeing that assigning blame could not su^ciently extort energy 
from others, North Korea swiftly realised that it had to seek new 
partnerships with both China and Russia. Regular meetings were 
held to foster cooperation through the 50-year old Korea-China 
Hydroelectric Power Company.24 Yet despite evidence of meetings 
throughout the years,25 very little transpires about the content of 
meetings, resolutions, and agreements. Even though China has 
been involved in several projects to help develop North Korea’s 
economy, with yearly investments of more than $15 million (USD) – 
representing close to 85% of the total foreign investment in North 
Korea – it is unclear whether or not Pyongyang will come out of its 
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closed economic system.26 At the same time, China’s role in North 
Korean security energy is ambiguous, with Lee suggesting that Bei-
jing could be deploying energy as a foreign policy leverage to ensure 
stability in the region.27 As a result, there is some guarded interest 
for engaging Pyongyang, but some attempts have been made such 
as the Tumen River Area Development Program: initially launched 
in 1991 by the UN, China, Russia, North Korea and Mongolia, and 
aiming to jointly develop ‘trade and investment, transport and 
communications, environment, tourism and energy.’28 But such 
programmes are very limited in scope, and have not yet created 
momentum for expanding partnerships to other countries. Hence, 
the promising option of a regional opening has not become a real-
ity, though it is the option most favoured by economists.29 One of 
the main factors that prevented countries other than China from 
investing in North Korea is the paucity of information available on 
how to open up contacts with North Korea, as well as what criteria 
and conditions for investments are in the country. As Kim states, 
North Korea still ‘lacks basic frameworks needed for drawing in 
foreign investment. Policies, laws and regulations about tax, for in-
stance, are not in place.’30
Moreover, limited data is available on raw production outputs, 
as Pyongyang cultivates the rhetorical art of being speciﬁc while 
remaining vague, with output ﬁgures often given as percentage of 
energy produced compared to previous years’ data, which largely 
remains unspeciﬁed (further contextualise). As such, increases in 
electricity production in 1999 is listed as 45% more than in 1998 
leading to important questions: given the climactic disruptions 
that year, one cannot fail to wonder if the 1999 production was not, 
in fact, lower than outputs in 1995 or 1996.31 Figures gathered or 
extrapolated by other experts strengthen this position, with some 
suggesting that North Korea’s energy production had, by 2000, 
fallen to a quarter of its 1990 level.32 Under a new long term plan 
though, emphasis started to be placed on energy economisation 
and rationalisation33 and North Korea began to develop a range of 
technologies such as solar energy, the utilisation of tidal power, as 
well as methane-fuelled heating systems.34 Towards the end of the 
2000s, ever more emphasis was put on improving living standards, 
especially in more rural areas.35 
cejiss
1/2012
148
Changing Pace in a  Changing Environment? 
By the mid-2000s, economic indicators started to point at a very 
slow economic recovery,36 thus suggesting marginal success with 
Pyongyang’s commitment to ‘direct big eﬀorts to operating power 
plants at full capacity, step up the construction of large hydro-pow-
er plants and build new large power plants.’37 This was noted in the 
literature just a few years after Kim Jong Il o^cially assumed power, 
and was understood as heavy industry and agriculture centric rath-
er than light industry and agriculture centric.38 Eventually, power 
station projects, construction and upgrades to existing plants were 
widely reported in the North Korean news.39 Indeed, changes such 
as improving drinking-water reserves, protecting ﬂood-prone ar-
able land as well as ensuring sustained irrigation suggested higher 
productivity in a more energy-secured environment.40 In parallel, 
coal gas power plants were still being built but development of new 
process to gasify coal was prioritised throughout the past decade.41 
But most of the production has been achieved thanks to an apparent 
commitment to geological prospection that has taken place both in 
terms of actual search of new resources, as well as the development 
of new technologies to prospect more e^ciently. As such, a massive 
geological survey was undertaken in the early 2000s, leading to the 
drawing of more than 5,000 maps to aid surveying for resources.42 
New technological developments by Kim Chaek University of Tech-
nology also appeared to have aided prospection, with machines no 
longer requiring boring. As such, North Korea claims to have ex-
ported the technology to China, Russia as well as Laos, Thailand 
and Namibia43 while its satellite imaging eﬀorts led to the discovery 
of many underground water resources as well as coal and copper 
reserves.44 Smaller developments in more speciﬁc areas of produc-
tion also appear to show that North Korea is slowly modernising 
some of its infrastructures: computer systems installed in 2003 at 
the Sunchon Cement Complex for example led to improvements in 
ﬁrebricks energy-generating length,45 while research in more accu-
rate meteorological equipment could reduce hydro-electric power 
construction costs signiﬁcantly.46 
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Technological Changes
Such investments support the argument that North Korea has 
started to gradually shift its focus from production at all costs to 
considering ways to support various sectors and increase their pro-
ductivity through modernisation. This change is largely noticeable 
with North Korea’s realisation that rural areas must be developed in 
order to strengthen the economy as a whole.47 Rural villages start-
ed to be outﬁtted with methane units and solar panels as heating 
sources48 and solar energy was also being used to heat greenhouses 
promoting ﬁsh breeding and vegetable production while recycling 
methane by-products to heat and light villages.49 The impetus for 
such technological developments could be attributed, in part, to 
the Scientiﬁc and Technological Presentation on Natural Energies 
held in 2006 and which focused on scientiﬁc and technological re-
searches and experiences for eﬀectively developing and utilising 
various energies and saving them and achievements in the research 
and introduction of diﬀerent kinds of combustion devices and 
heat-preserving methods of heating facilities.50 
Some technologies focused on how to use residual energy from 
heat furnaces and boilers51 and also showcased technologies used 
in the Tudan Duck Farm and developed in partnership with Kim 
Chaek Technological University: it reuses methane gas produced by 
ducks living in climate-controlled farms fuelled by geothermal heat. 
Kim Jong Il praised the process during his 2009 visit,52 and further 
geothermic and solar energies are being developed at the Yongsong 
Machine Complex and at the Solar Equipment Centre in Mangyong-
dae.53 It is questionable, however, whether such small projects would 
be able to resolve North Korea’s massive energy problems, as they 
probably could only be ‘providing power and energy services to local 
areas when national-level supply systems are unreliable at best.’54
Learning about the World
Technological awareness and innovations are only one aspect of North 
Korea’s changing relationship with energy as Pyongyang appears to 
have a deep interest in domestic energy policies that have been imple-
mented by some of its trading partners. For example, North Korea re-
ports on China’s drive to save energy and highlights the newest Chinese 
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ﬁve-year plan (energy-saving companies increased from 80 in 2005 to 
more than 800 ﬁve years later55) and focuses on Russia’s Siberia mod-
ernisation approach through oil pipeline projects.56 Moreover, North 
Korea appears interested in how Venezuela has chosen to tackle its en-
ergy problems by using educational programmes and public relation 
campaigns aiming at raising its citizens’ awareness of energy-wasting.57 
Pyongyang also highlights Cuba’s low-energy houses and bathrooms 
running on only two litres of water and recycling wastes for irrigation 
purposes and bio-gas to generate lighting, an example very relevant for 
North Korea’s work on its own farming villages.58 
Large-scale projects are also on Pyongyang’s radar but while North 
Korea is still conﬁdent that hydroelectric power must be developed 
and as such outlines Panama’s eﬀorts to build twelve new hydropower 
plants,59 its outlook is resolutely focused on gas. Indeed, Iran’s natural 
gas production and the construction of the Qom reservoir to store 
Iran’s reserves is noted by North Korea as being the second-largest 
in the world.60 This interest in natural gas belies Pyongyang’s hopes 
for the development of a Russian gas pipeline that would cross North 
Korea and could help open up the country to other Asian markets,61 
and points to its will to devote more time and resources toward its 
own gas generation projects. Developing new technology outlets to 
enhance its production appears to be a cornerstone of North Korea’s 
energy policy: citing the examples of Spain and the Toresol Energy 
Company’s plans to develop solar facilities capable of delivering ener-
gy round the clock62 and Indonesia’s plans to develop solar cell power 
generators63 shows this shift in attitude. Indeed, by 2011, North Ko-
rea appears to be focusing its attention toward confronting its energy 
shortage in a more e^cient manner than in the past, especially by no 
longer relying on energy resources promised by or negotiated within 
the Agreed Framework or the Six-Party Talks process. In this sense, 
North Korea appears to be returning to some of its “Chu’che” values 
of self-reliance and economic pride. This change has also been noted 
by several researchers who have recently met with the North Korean 
elite.64 
Environmental Protection
Could this apparent return to self-reliance be nothing more than 
a  rational way of using energy while preserving resources which 
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would eventually be needed in the future? Pyongyang’s potential 
commitment to geothermal technology is clearly stated when dis-
cussing Reykjavik’s approach to using energy which is not only 
e^cient but also does not harm the environment: North Korea’s 
more radical development over the past two years is therefore its 
apparent concern for internationally-agreed targets such as pollu-
tion levels and the Millennium Development Goals. At the same 
time, Pyongyang is concerned with inﬂated and unfair energy pric-
es generally aﬀecting the developing world and this could indicate 
that North Korea is concerned with the necessity to adopt capitalist 
market structures while still being ideologically opposed to becom-
ing a  non-socialist system. Pyongyang is also as reluctant as ever 
to depend on a limited amount of resources controlled by external 
market forces, and stresses this through the example of Cambodia’s 
recent appeal at the UNGA for the international community to 
work on the food and energy crisis.65 Articles also highlight Indo-
nesia’s eﬀorts to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels and its focus 
on developing renewable energy sources66 and South African poli-
cies to reduce dependency on coal resources and ﬁghting for green-
house gas emissions reduction.67 
North Korea and the Global Energy Community 
The discourses are sophisticated but lead to questions regarding 
Korea’s true intentions when it comes to saving the environment 
given the country’s past environmental abuses and heavy deforesta-
tion in the 1980s and 1990s which led to unstable soils and many 
deadly mudslides during ﬂoods. The data suggests, however, that 
North Korea’s newfound concern for the environment is crafty 
a way of marrying self-reliance and increased e^ciency: Pyongyang 
has relegated old technologies such as coal mining to a more mini-
mal role and has chosen new energy policies in the hope of gaining 
e^ciency and stability while at the same time continuing to de-
velop nuclear energy. As such, the country’s recent energy policy 
can be divided into two broad lines: one the one hand, Pyongyang 
is conscious that new partnerships must be developed, but on the 
other hand, there is a strong desire to remain self-su^cient which 
leads to a sustained rhetoric on its right to produce nuclear energy. 
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Whether or not North Korean nuclear energy will only be used in 
a peaceful way is more questionable, however. 
A Reasonable Stakeholder?
North Korea’s relationship to the international community is a rath-
er complex one: on the one hand, Pyongyang has had very limited 
contacts with other states and its participation in international or-
ganisations and in global governance more generaly is rather scant, 
but on the other hand recent years have shown more consistency 
in considering partnerships. North Korea also started to take on 
a more active role in the global community by actively participating 
in international meetings on energy such as the recent World Con-
gress on Wind Energy that took place in Cairo in November 2011, 
and during which its delegates outlined the nation’s wind strate-
gies.68 Prior to this Congress, North Korea had held several interna-
tional workshops on the environment in Pyongyang since the mid-
2000s, and has focused on ‘measures to improve and strengthen the 
environmental protection such as ecological environment, technol-
ogy of using resources, water puriﬁcation technology, and use of 
renewable energy and protection of birds’ habitats.’69 North Korea’s 
adoption of vocabulary such as “greenhouse gas emissions” or “cli-
mate changes” in 2007 also suggests a new North Korean role and 
place within the international community70 and is also exempliﬁed 
in its active participation at the 65th meeting of the Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Paciﬁc of the UN held in Thai-
land in 2008: all of these forums allow the country to have a voice 
on the global scene without, for once, being the target of sanctions 
and criticisms.71 North Korea’s legal framework even started in 2011 
to codify ‘the development and use of renewable energy, the estab-
lishment of an environmental authentication system and the intro-
duction of technologies of recycling resources.’72 This overall sense 
of responsibility and need to be concerned with its own resources 
is also mirrored in new prospection endeavours well beyond North 
Korean borders, with Pyongyang highlighting the fact that the Arc-
tic region is likely to become the terrain for ‘a  state of new Cold 
War’ over who can claim them ﬁrst.73 Such stance is also paving the 
way for independence in dealing with its own potentially lucrative 
but yet unexploited mineral resources: North Korea is sensitive to 
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China’s advances in seeking legal rights to exploit deep sea beds,74 
as well as the recent discovery of a new natural gas ﬁelds in the Gulf 
of Mexico.75
Nuclear Energy 
But North Korea has adamantly kept on defending its right to de-
velop nuclear energy over the years and has denied any collusion 
with other dangerous nations even though the United States has 
alleged that uranium hexaﬂuoride had been sold to Iran and that 
North Korea had sold motors for nuclear facilities to Libya with 
Pakistan’s logistical help.76 It is thus very likely that North Korea 
will pursue nuclear power as it has engaged in a  much broader 
campaign to justify its own right to have a peaceful nuclear pro-
gramme by showing that other countries including South Korea are 
developing the technology without being singled out. Pyongyang 
has been especially active in this regard in 2011 by focusing on Cu-
ba’s commitment to ‘using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’77 
while at the same citing data from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s Technical Cooperation Division for Latin America outlin-
ing more than seventy peaceful nuclear development projects cur-
rently underway in parts of Latin American and the Caribbean.78 
Pyongyang also did not fail to address Iran’s nuclear programme 
and Teheran’s willingness to maintain its peaceful nuclear energy 
programme despite growing concerns from the international com-
munity.79 Moreover, North Korea relied on heavy-weights’ stances 
on nuclear energy, focusing on Russia, China and France’s contin-
ued commitment to nuclear energy.80 
Justifying nuclear technology is interwoven with a will to draw 
attention on worldwide problems of energy supply, dependency and 
aﬀordability, and energy saving. North Korea shows here an acute 
understanding of world issues, a surprising feature given how self-
reliant and remote from the international community it often ap-
pears to be. Problems of pricing and resources are usually addressed 
by presenting facts such as the rising energy prices in the US,81 the 
monitoring of price increases in Germany by the summer of 2011,82 
and by presenting China’s calls at the recent G20 summit in Cannes 
to take actions toward stabilising commodity prices worldwide by 
creating a more stable energy market.83 North Korea also appears 
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concerned with “old enemies” and there is an obvious grudge still 
held toward Japan and its plundering of Korean resources during its 
colonial period (‘the Japanese imperialists plundered Korea of gold, 
silver and other kinds of minerals, agricultural products including 
rice and cotton, marine, foreign and all other resources during their 
colonial rule’84). As such, North Korea is wary of Japan trying to take 
over disputed islands with a view to exploit resources85 while also 
being concerned with Japan potentially exploiting some of Kaza-
khstan’s uranium natural reserves.86 Even though North Korea’s fo-
cus appears to be on resources, the message is largely political, as it 
warns of imperialistic tendencies and persecuted weaker countries 
robbed of their natural attributes: for example, Pyongyang high-
lights the US’s apparent design to use the Middle Eastern terrorist 
menace to gain control of oil and natural gas resources in strategic 
areas such as Central Asia.87 There is also a sharp focus on how US 
allies might be following on similar trends with Hezbollah’s claims 
that Israel is attempting to take control of Lebanese gas and oil oﬀ-
shore resources.88 Concepts of fairness and equalities are important 
to North Korea when considering Sudanese oil production, and 
how revenue should be divided between North Sudan and South 
Sudan.89 In essence, Pyongyang is concerned about its own coop-
eration patterns with South Korea on how new minerals reserves 
should be exploited, and is exempliﬁed through Lebanon’s drive to 
exploit its own oﬀshore gas reserves in order to become an energy 
exporter90 or Zimbabwe’s commitment to process its own minerals 
by including new clauses in its legislation.91 Pyongyang also displays 
a sophisticated sense of justice when considering US oil pollution 
stemming out of some of its military bases in South Korea, and how 
it aﬀects the local environment,92 as well as calls by Brazil for Chev-
ron to come clean about its recent oil spillage oﬀ its coasts.93 
Consequently, North Korea has been cautious in developing ener-
gy relationships with its neighbours but has also started to consider 
new projects at the regional and global level: a joint declaration be-
tween Pyongyang and Moscow in July 2000 speaks of cooperation 
that will take place in ‘various ﬁelds such as metal, power, transport, 
forestry, oil, gas and light industries’94 while recent meetings held as 
late as August 2011 suggest that gas provision as well as the linking 
of railway systems were being worked on.95 An extensive joint en-
ergy programme was also bolstered by the late Kim Jong Il’s August 
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2011 visit to several parts of Russia including Far East regions and 
parts of Siberia.96 The crux of the talks involved Russia’s newest gas 
pipeline project and whether it should be laid across North Korea, 
hence allowing Pyongyang access to gas while enabling Russia, one 
of the world’s largest natural gas producers, to supply the Asia-Pacif-
ic region.97 Hence, Pyongyang has suggested that were the pipeline 
project to go ahead, the Six-Party Talks process could be likely posi-
tively aﬀected.98 If the Six-Party Talks could restart through a new 
conversation on denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, it might 
also be possible to develop the Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue and rela-
tionship to new heights. Indeed, inter-ministerial talks held in 2001 
opened up discussion on a number of energy-related topics, with an 
emphasis on ‘re-linking the Sinuiju-Seoul railways’, ‘supplying elec-
tricity’, as well as discussing the gas pipeline issue,99 and eventually 
closed with an agreement to ‘positively cooperate with each other 
to put the project of linking the two parts of Korea-Russia railways 
into practice and examine the work of linking gas pipeline.’100 At 
the same time, North Korea appears keen on strengthening “South-
South” cooperation, calling for ‘economic and technological coop-
eration among developing countries’ though it is unclear whether 
or not Pyongyang considers itself to be part of the developing world 
or at the forefront of assistance: some of its current projects sur-
prisingly include ‘the training of specialists in various ﬁelds such 
as agriculture, science and technology, water resources and minor 
hydro-power stations for developing countries in Asia and Africa.’101 
Though this international cooperation is promising, much more 
should be done for North Korea to develop a stable energy system, 
and such rehabilitation will ‘require major intergovernmental co-
operation, investment by international ﬁnancial institutions and 
technology transfer’, according to Williams.102 
Conclusion:  Empty Words or the Beginning of 
a  New Korea?
While it is undeniable that energy is North Korea’s economy policy 
cornerstone, Pyongyang’s eﬀorts to redevelop its energy production 
capacities are very limited when compared to the amount of eﬀort, 
investment, and openness to international cooperation a complete 
rehabilitation of the North Korean energy system would entail. 
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Despite this important shortcoming, analysing North Korea’s en-
ergy rhetoric since the late 1990s yields surprising results about the 
degree of sophistication North Korea shows, especially in regards 
to Pyongyang’s growing understanding of and interaction with the 
international system. As such, the country has emphasised its gen-
eral approach toward production while at the same time delving 
into a multitude of topics related to energy development. Overall 
rhetoric is therefore articulated around the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea’s broad energy policies and development which 
includes its general propaganda on production as well as its future 
targets, and the celebration of milestones such as improvements 
in energy production as well as new technical prowess.  Over the 
past few years, new trends have also developed and have slowly 
started to replace propaganda and achievements: North Korea has 
started to showcase its resources, perhaps with the view to provide 
a  stronger image of its production as well as to attract potential 
businesses. Hence, resource-related articles publicise existing eco-
nomic and development areas and highlight current underground 
resource prospection projects. Construction of new energy plants 
have also been showcased especially recently, with an emphasis on 
both new commissioned units as well as future investments. The 
last category that has recently started to emerge from North Korea’s 
engagement in various projects is a rather surprising one given the 
country’s di^cult economic conditions and limited engagement 
with the international community:  while new rhetoric on how to 
develop new ways of producing energy at a cheaper cost is under-
standably of concern to Pyongyang, its new commitments to in-
ternational environmental standards and its apparent work toward 
sustainable development is rather unexpected. 
How much credit can be given to this discourse, especially given 
the fact that the Korean Central News Agency is notorious for its 
daily and sustained anti-American rhetoric and general aggressive 
stances that are anything but constructive? The question of how 
Pyongyang aims to portray itself through its only news outlet is 
central, and has diﬀerent implications for diﬀerent actors. Indeed, 
when it comes to the North Korean population, most of the articles 
aim at controlling and inﬂuencing North Korean citizens’ percep-
tion of their own country as well as of the world. As such, domestic 
eﬀorts are lauded, while the international environment is described 
North Korea’s 
Energy
Security 
Dilemma
157
as a place where North Korea has a hoist of relationships, and where 
North Korea’s traditional “enemies” are not always faring well. For 
the international reader, be they laymen or expert, the KCNA ener-
gy-focused articles oﬀer a departure from unconstructive rhetoric 
centred on old animosities between North Korea and the United 
States or Japan. It also highlights the fact that Pyongyang is not in 
denial about the need to redevelop its energy system, and that even 
though self-reliance is praised and favoured, the international envi-
ronment might provide an answer to North Korean plights. If it fails 
to give economic advantages, it can at least be used as a justiﬁcation 
for North Korea to pursue speciﬁc policies, and as a way to show its 
population it is at the forefront of science when developing new 
types of energy that are also being implemented around the world. 
Overall, the analysis shows that North Korea is trying to update 
its energy network system, and has also done so in a relatively inde-
pendent way, even though China has been investing into North Ko-
rean infrastructure.103 Could North Korea slowly rehabilitate itself 
through its stance on energy, and its participation in several inter-
national projects? Could North Korea even be seen as a reasonable 
stakeholder? Some have argued that North Korea now has ‘estab-
lished o^cial relations with nearly all governments in Europe and 
Asia, been admitted to the ARF, and received substantial food and 
energy assistance from the KEDO members.’104 In this sense, talking 
about the environment and the concept of sustainability is a con-
versation North Korea can take part in without being castigated for 
unlawful or inhuman behaviour, as long as this does not involve nu-
clear energy. But because of the nature of the North Korean regime 
and how the country has been understood as a rogue state by many 
in the literature, there are very few avenues left for Pyongyang to 
interact with the international system.105 Therefore, if North Korea 
wants to hold a conversation with main powers such as Japan or 
the US, it will be forced to change some of its behaviours in light 
of sanctions and international pressure. Eventually, North Korea’s 
interest in energy and especially environmental issues of sustain-
ability might lead to a reform within the North Korea society, with 
‘a hybrid system in which the state provides a basic supply of crucial 
goods and leaves the distribution of the remaining available output 
to free markets.’106 In the meantime though, North Korea’s focus 
on developing new ways to become energy-sustainable should be 
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noted by the international community, and should also bring about 
a more constructive understanding of North Korea not just as an 
Axis of Evil, but as a country that should be helped to open up so 
that investments can beneﬁt those who need it the most, and who 
are oftentimes forgotten: the North Korean underprivileged popu-
lation that has given its all to support a system that is unsustainable 
if it remains closed up. With Kim Jong Un recently becoming the 
new North Korea leader, it will be crucial to monitor North Ko-
rea’s understanding of the energy sector even further for any sign 
of opening. 
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